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Abstract
Several different theoretical models of economic growth and environmental quality each gen-
erate inverse-U-shaped pollution-income paths, or “environmental Kuznets curves.” They rely on
different assumptions to generate the reversal of pollution trends, with correspondingly different
policy implications. While the empirical implications for pollution are indistinguishable (by de-
sign), the models have distinct implications for the pattern of people’s marginal willingness to pay
(MWTP) for environmental improvements as a function of income. In this paper we demonstrate
those different implications theoretically, and test for them empirically using data from the World
Value Survey (WVS). We ﬁnd strong relationships between MWTP and individual characteris-
tics, such as age, income, and education, but little evidence that MWTP varies systematically with
economic growth.
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ﬁnancial support (grant #SES-9905576).1This pattern has come to be called an "environmental Kuznets curve," after Simon Kuznets' observation that
income inequality appears follow a similar pattern, increasing and then decreasing with countries' incomes.
2Bartlett (1994) wrote in the Wall Street Journal that "existing environmental regulation, by reducing
economic growth, may actually be reducing environmental quality." 
1.  Introduction
Recent empirical evidence has documented some forms of local pollution (airborne
lead, sulfur) that have declined significantly in industrialized countries despite robust
economic growth.  Poor countries appear relatively unpolluted, middle-income countries
more polluted, and rich countries clean again.
1  Because this evidence comes from reduced-
form, country-level regressions of pollution on per-capita GDP, the cause of this inverse-U
pattern is uncertain and the policy implications are ambiguous.  Some have inferred that
poor countries are not efficiently regulating externalities.  Others have concluded that
environmental progress eventually becomes an automatic consequence of economic
growth.
2  If nothing else, these disparate claims highlight the need for a causal explanation
of the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality.
In very recent years, several theoretical explanations have circulated.  Because
these theories were designed to generate inverse-U-shaped pollution-income patterns, they
cannot be distinguished empirically on the basis of those patterns.  However, the theories
have different implications for people's marginal "willingness to pay" for environmental
cleanup, and therefore may have testable empirical predictions using international surveys
of environmental priorities. 
We begin by noting that the inverse-U-shaped pollution-income relationship may
be based entirely on individual preferences. This "individual preferences" explanation
demonstrates that the observed pattern of pollution and income is not sufficient evidence
that low-income countries set either Pareto-efficient or inefficient policies.  Without any
institutional barriers to accommodating individual preferences, this explanation has no
implications for policy.  Moreover, the stark prediction of this explanation is that people's
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for environmental quality will be the same at
different income levels, ceteris paribus.
We then identify three theoretical explanations that depend on institutional
differences between countries with varying levels of per-capita GDP.  These include
constraints on technologies, constraints on government institutions, and returns to scale in
pollution abatement.  Some of the models predict that MWTP increases with income, some
predict increasing and then decreasing MWTP, while still others have no implications for
the pattern of MWTP and income.  Furthermore, because the models rely on different
mechanisms to generate the inverse-U-shaped pollution-income path, they have different
policy implications. 
In what follows we examine patterns of willingness to pay across households with
different incomes and countries with different levels of GDP, using household-level data
from the third wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), a poll of about 70,000
respondents in 48 countries.  Among other questions, the survey asked "would you be
1
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Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 20043While a number of CV studies have examined how stated willingness to pay for environmental quality varies
by household income within a country, both in industrialized and developing countries (Flores and Carson,
1997; Whittington, 1998), and some studies compare aggregate summaries of stated willingness to pay or
support for the environment across countries (Bloom, 1995), our project will be one of the first to use
individual survey responses to compare how willingness to pay varies both across and within countries. (See
Israel (2004) for a similar examination of these issues using a different data set with 15 countries.)
4A second problem with the individual preferences explanation, and with figure 1, is that it is not clear what
the origin of the graph represents. If the linear "frontiers" in figure 1 represent tradeoffs between
environmental quality and consumption, then a poor country is endowed with both low consumption and high
pollution.  A more realistic model would endow poor countries with clean environments, along with the
ability to trade environmental quality for consumption.
willing to pay 20 percent higher prices to protect the environment?" and "which is more
important: environmental quality or economic growth?"  While these do not conform to
standard contingent valuation protocols, we are not seeking specific dollar measures of
willingness to pay.  Instead, we only wish to see whether the patterns of marginal
willingness to pay conform to those predicted by the models.  For this purpose the WVS
provides a reasonable first look at these previously unstudied empirical implications of the
growth and environment theories.
3
2.  Theories of growth and environmental quality
One commonly heard explanation for the observed inverse-U-shaped pollution-
income path is that it reflects the natural progression of economic development, from clean
agrarian economies to dirty industrial economies to clean service economies.  This
explanation has no normative implications for the future pattern of pollution and economic
growth, since we cannot forecast the nature of the next phase of economic development
after service economies.  A related explanation is that rich countries become cleaner by
importing those products whose manufacture creates the most pollution.  This suggests that
the pattern cannot be repeated indefinitely, because the poorest countries will never have
poorer countries from which they can import their polluting goods.
Alternatively, the entire curve may be explained by individual preferences.  Perhaps
the inverse-U-shaped pollution-income path merely represents non-monotonic income
expansion paths, or Engel curves, as pictured in figure 1.  No economic theory implies that
goods must be normal or inferior in all ranges of income, and cannot switch back and forth.
While it may seem improbable that given the same prices, poor people choose clean
environments, middle-income people prefer to trade clean environments for other goods,
and rich people prefer clean environments, no economic fundamentals would be violated
by such a pattern.
4  And, this explanation predicts that MWTP for improvements in the
environment will be constant with respect to income. 
In contrast, three recent theoretical explanations for the observed inverse-U-shaped
pollution-income path rely on institutional characteristics of economies, rather than
individual preferences.  We have labeled these explanations "technology constraints,"
"institutional constraints," and "returns to scale."  The technology constraint explanation,
2
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as polluting as they can possibly be, given available resources and technologies.  In these
papers, there is some most polluting form of production.  Poor countries would like to use
even dirtier and cheaper technologies, but none exist.  As poor economies expand, they
become both dirtier and richer.  Once a country is sufficiently wealthy and polluted, the
marginal cost of abating pollution becomes worthwhile, and pollution begins to decrease
gradually with economic growth as less polluting, more expensive technologies are
employed.  The normative implication of this explanation is that the observed inverse-U
shape can represent a Pareto-optimal response to technological constraints.  If we were to
relax those constraints somehow, poor countries would only become more polluted faster.
In these models, the only efficient way to become less polluted is to grow.
The institutional constraint explanation is that some obstacle prevents poor
countries from establishing the social institutions necessary to regulate pollution.  An
example would be the political-economic barriers in Jones and Manuelli (2001).  Once a
country is wealthy enough, these fixed costs become worth incurring, environmental
agencies are established, and pollution begins to decline with economic growth.  A
normative implication of this explanation is that the welfare in developing countries might
be improved by assistance in overcoming the fixed costs of establishing environmental
agencies.
The returns-to-scale explanation, represented by Andreoni and Levinson (2001),
is that as economies become larger, abating the marginal unit of pollution becomes
cheaper, and larger economies therefore abate more.  In this case, the empirical observation
of an inverse-U pattern has no normative policy implications.  With only one agent, all
decisions are by definition Pareto-optimal.  With multiple agents, both the decentralized
(sub-optimal) and centralized equilibria exhibit inverse-U-shapes, with the difference being
that the decentralized pattern reaches a peak pollution level at higher income and with more
pollution.  Merely observing an inverse-U is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient
evidence that the underlying pattern is efficient or inefficient.
Each of these three explanations predicts that pollution levels will rise and then fall
with economic growth.  They are, therefore, indistinguishable empirically using only data
on countries' incomes and pollution levels.  Each has, however, a different prediction about
the pattern of households' marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for environmental
improvements as a function of national income. 
In the technology constraint explanation, poor countries start with low MWTP (they
would trade worse environmental quality for more income).  But no technology exists that
can reduce pollution at such low marginal cost, and so poor countries do no abatement.  As
they become richer and more polluted, they become more willing to trade income for
environmental improvements.  At some point a country is rich and polluted enough that it
becomes worthwhile investing in a marginal amount of abatement technology, and
pollution begins to decline gradually with economic growth.  MWTP increases with
income up to the point where the technological constraint is relaxed.  Beyond that point,
the pattern of MWTP and income depends other factors.  Under the functional form and
parameters in Stokey (1998), MWTP continues to increase with income.
3
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costs of developing environmental protection agencies.  As their economies grow, they
become richer and more polluted until it becomes worthwhile incurring those fixed costs.
At that point an environmental agency is established, externalities are internalized,
pollution declines, and MWTP stops increasing and declines.  After the externalities are
internalized, the pattern of MWTP is indeterminate.
In the returns-to-scale explanation, as countries become richer abatement becomes
cheaper.  At the same time, if clean air is a normal good, as people are richer they will have
higher MWTP.  The pattern of MWTP and incomes thus depends on whether, as incomes
rise, abatement costs fall faster or slower than preferences for abating pollution rise.  
Together, these theoretical explanations for the observed inverse-U-shaped
pollution-income path generate separate predictions for the patterns of MWTP and national
income.  If the observed path is due to individual preferences, or to the returns-to-scale
story of Andreoni and Levinson (2001), MWTP need not exhibit any particular pattern with
respect to national income.  If the path is due to technological constraints, as in Stokey
(1988), MWTP will increase with national income, at least for poor countries.  And if the
path is due to institutional constraints as in Jones and Manuelli (2001), MWTP will rise and
then fall with national income.  
Before turning to international survey data to look for evidence of these patterns
of MWTP, we first demonstrate the theoretical arguments in more detail. First we derive
the MWTP in the technology constraint model.  We then depict MWTP in both the
technology constraint and institutional constraint models graphically, using standard
indifference curves and budget constraints.  Finally, we generalize both models to
incorporate the returns-to-scale story. 
 
2.1  Technology constraint
Stokey (1998) describes a static model with a choice of production technologies
with varying degrees of pollution.  John and Pecchenino (1994) present an overlapping
generations model in which environmental quality is a stock resource that degrades over
time unless maintained by investment.  Both models yield pollution-income relationships
that are inverse-V-shaped, peaking when the equilibria switch from corner solutions with
zero environmental investment to interior optima with positive investment.
Each of these stories involves the conclusion that at low levels of income, countries
are somehow endowed with an excess of environmental quality.  Stokey's producers would
like to use an even more polluting but cheaper technology, were one available.  Since it is
not, they use the dirtiest available technology and pollution increases steadily with
production until such time as they begin to value the environment and switch to cleaner
technologies.  Similarly, John and Pecchenino's citizens would like to trade environmental
quality for other goods, but cannot, so they slowly degrade their environment with
polluting production until they reach an income threshold beyond which they care about
pollution and begin to invest in environmental quality.
Stokey starts with a representative agent's utility function: 
4
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(,) () () UCP VC hP = − (1)
where C is consumption and P is pollution, and V() and h() are subutility functions.  Stokey
assumes that consumption is produced from potential income (M) using some technology,
indexed by 20(0,1], where 2=1 is the dirtiest possible technology.   Consumption is equal
to 2M, and pollution generated is P=N(2)M, where N(0)=0, N'(0)=0, N(1)=1, N'(1)=1, and
N''(0)>0.  The government's role is to choose 2 to maximize (1) subject to these







The left-hand side of (2) is the MWTP for a decrease in pollution.
Stokey then defines M* as the threshold level of potential income (the economy's
endowment) below which it will always be optimal to choose 2*(M)=1 for all M<M*.
Above M*, 2*(M)<1, which means that some pollution abatement takes place in the form
of cleaner technologies employed.
Figure 2 depicts this setup.
5  The downward sloping concave lines represent the
available tradeoffs between pollution and consumption, defined by the function N(2).  For
M<M*, preferences are such that the marginal willingness to pay for abatement is less than
the marginal rate of technical substitution implied (assumed to be N(1)=1), and no
abatement takes place.  In figure 2 when the economy is small, with endowment of
potential income M1, the indifference curve is steeper than the consumption possibility
frontier, and we are at a corner solution where consumption is M1 and pollution is P1.  
As the economy grows, so long as M<M*, 2=1, the dirtiest technology is employed,
pollution increases, and the MWTP increases (the slopes of the indifference curves at
corner solutions like 1 and 2 become flatter). At some point, the economy grows
sufficiently and becomes sufficiently polluted that the slope of the indifference curve
equals the slope of the technology frontier, and we move to an interior solution.  Such an
interior is depicted at point 3.  Notice that pollution increases and then decreases as income
grows.
Algebraically, MWTP is h'(MN(2))/V'(2M) in equation (2).  So long as M<M*, this
is equal to h'(M)/V'(M).  And, so long as environmental quality is a normal good, and the
marginal utility of consumption is diminishing, MWTP increases with income.  
When M>M*, and cleaner technologies become optimal, the pattern of MWTP with
respect to income is less clear.  Stokey uses the following functional forms as an example:
5
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where $>1, F>0, (>1, b>0.  In this case, the marginal willingness to pay is 
(1 ) 1 MWTP b M
βγ σ γ σ θ
−+ +− = (4)
and MMWTP/MM > 1, so MWTP increases with income even after the technology threshold
is passed, though this is not necessarily the case for all values of the parameters.
The empirical implication of this technology constraint explanation is that all else
equal, richer countries will have higher MWTP than poor countries, at least up until the
point where pollution starts to improve with income.  This implication is in theory testable
using international survey data.  Before describing the test however, we derive contrasting
implications from competing theoretical explanations for the inverse-U-shaped pollution-
income pattern.
2.2  Institutional constraints
A second explanation is that some institutional constraints block poor countries
from enacting legislation to clean up their economies.  Jones and Manuelli's (2001) model
consists of two overlapping generations in which the younger generation sets pollution
regulations.  Depending on the voting mechanism, the pollution-income relationship can
be an inverted-U, monotonically increasing, or even a "sideways-mirrored-S" (what others
have called "N-shaped").  In their model, all of the dynamics come from the political
economy.  Pollution is a flow, lasting only one period, and is only suffered by the older
generation.  Consequently, much of the intuition in their model can be described in a static
framework along the lines of the technology constraint discussion.
Figure 3 depicts this model graphically.  Begin with the smallest endowment
economy, the rectangle bordered by M1.  The resource constraint faced by a representative
consumer is the kinked thick line.  The short segment along the bottom right corner of the
box represents the fixed costs of enacting regulation (political-economic costs in Jones and
Manuelli).  Once these fixed costs are incurred, the economy can abate pollution at some
cost of foregone consumption.  The highest indifference curve this small economy can
attain is in the lower right corner of the endowment box, where no abatement takes place.
As the economy expands, and M grows, MWTP increases until at some point the optimum
will jump from the corner solution of no abatement (sucn as point 2 in the graph) to an
interior solution with abatement (such as point 2a). 
6
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solution, where no abatement takes place, as M increases MWTP increases, just as in the
Stokey model when M<M*.  At the threshold where abatement takes place, however, in
this scenario there is a discrete jump from the corner to an interior solution.  Pollution falls
suddenly, and MWTP falls, from point 2 to point 2a in figure 3.  Beyond this threshold, the
pattern of MWTP with respect to income depends on other things.  
Note that depicted this way, the institutional constraint explanation of Jones and
Manuelli is a special case of the technology constraint explanation of Stokey.  In both
stories, poor economies are stuck at the corner solution of no abatement -- the southeast
corner of their endowment boxes in figures 2 and 3.  As the economies grow, marginal
willingness to pay increases.  The difference is that in figure 2, the possibility frontier is
concave, so when the economy moves off the corner it does so gradually, and pollution is
gradually abated.  In figure 3, the frontier is convex, and so the economy jumps discretely
from the corner to some interior solution.
2.3  Returns to scale
A third model relies on returns to scale in the technology for abating pollution.
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) describe a one-agent, one-good, consumption model, with
no technological or institutional constraints on consumption or pollution abatement, in
which returns to scale in the abatement technology generates an inverse-U-shaped
pollution-income path.  They start with a general version of Stokey's utility function from
equation (1):
(,) UU C P = (5)
where UC>0 and UP<0.  Next, they assume that gross pollution is created as a byproduct
of consumption, but that pollution can be abated by devoting effort to cleanup.
(,) PCA C E = − (6)
where A() is the abatement function, E  is cleanup effort, and AC>0 and AE>0.  The single
agent is endowed with resources (M) that can be divided among consumption (C) and
abatement effort (E).
 
MCE = + (7)
Maximizing (5) subject to (6) and (7), and rearranging terms, yields the first order
condition
7
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The left-hand side of (8) is the marginal willingness to pay for environmental
improvement.  It is the slope of an indifference curve, plotted with consumption on the
bottom axis and pollution on the left axis, and it will always be positive in the optimum.
6
To find what happens to MWTP as income (M) increases, note that the derivative
of (8) with respect to M will have the same sign as the derivative of (AC-AE) with respect
to M:
2 CE EE CC CE EE
C
AA A AA
M −− +− +
+
∂    −+−+    ∂    (9)
As long as the abatement function has diminishing marginal product of C and E (ACC<0,
AEE<0), and the marginal product of E is increasing in C (ACE>0), and C is a normal good
(MC/MM>0), then the sign of (9) is ambiguous.  The left bracketed term is positive, the right
bracketed term is negative, and MC/MM is positive.
Figure 4 depicts what is happening graphically.  The smallest rectangle represents
the endowment (M1) of a small economy.  If the agent consumes nothing, no pollution is
created.  If the agent consumes the entire endowment M1, devoting nothing to abatement,
P1 units of pollution are generated.  The consumption possibility frontier, derived from A(),
depicts the tradeoff between pollution and consumption facing the economy.  Given convex
indifference curves, the agent will optimize at some point as depicted.  The MWTP in this
case is the inverse of the slope of the indifference curve at that tangency point.
Richer economies, with successively larger endowments M2 and M3 , are
represented by increasingly larger rectangles.  Andreoni and Levinson show that if the
abatement function A() has increasing returns to scale and environmental quality is a
normal good, the new point of tangency will at some point begin to have higher
consumption and lower pollution levels.  As depicted, pollution increases and then
decreases with the wealth of the economy.
Unlike the technology or institutional constraint explanations, this returns-to-scale
story is consistent with any pattern of MWTP.  Thus, although we can never rule out
returns to scale using MWTP data, if we do find evidence against the technology or
institutional constraints, we now have a substitute explanation for the inverse-U-shaped
pollution pattern.
8
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However, compared with alternative methodologies for calculating willingness to pay, such as travel costs,
hedonics, or averting behavior, CV seems at least as likely to generate comparable values across countries.
See Carson et al.(2000), and Smith (1997 and 2001), for defenses of CV methods.
8The first wave of the data was conducted only for European countries.  The last wave is not yet available.
The third wave is the only wave currently available with numerous environmental questions.
All of these institutional explanations have different implications for the pattern of
MWTP and national income per capita.  Under the technology constraint story, MWTP will
increase with income until the point that the threshold is passed and less polluting
technologies are chosen.  After that point MWTP is uncertain, but with Stokey's functional
form and parameters it continues rising.  Under the institutional constraints explanation,
MWTP rises until the point where environmental agencies are established, falls once the
externalities are internalized, and is indeterminate beyond that point.  Finally, the returns-
to-scale explanation has no prediction for the pattern of MWTP and income.
To look for support for these models, we turn to international survey data on
environmental valuations from the World Values Survey, and examine the empirical
patterns of people's expressed willingness to pay for environmental improvement as a
function of household and national incomes.
3.  Empirics
Perhaps the ideal way to examine the empirical relationship between MWTP and
national income would be to conduct an international contingent valuation (CV) study.
7
One could survey individuals' marginal willingness to pay for an extra unit of some local
air pollutant that has been shown to increase and then decrease with national income,
following established CV protocol, asking people to vote yes or no for a well defined
environmental benefit, with a well defined payment mechanism.  In the absence of such an
internationally comparable survey, we turn to what is arguably the next best alternative:
the World Values Survey (WVS).
The WVS is designed to be a representative survey carried out using consistent
methodologies across numerous countries.  We focus on the third wave of the survey,
carried out predominantly from 1995-96, with some countries surveyed in 1997 or 1998.
8
The appendix contains some of the key income and environment questions.  We combine
the WVS with national income data from the World Bank (2002).  Thirty-three countries
had consistent data on the environmental questions, national income, and associated
household characteristics.  The countries are listed, along with some descriptive statistics,
in the appendix.
While none of the WVS environment questions listed in the appendix conform to
standard contingent valuation protocols, some come close enough to make comparisons of
responses across households and countries worthwhile.  For example, one question asks
"would you be willing to pay 20 percent higher prices to protect the environment."  (See
the appendix for the exact format and wording.)  Respondents are asked to pick from
9
Israel and Levinson: Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 20049In theory, this leaves the survey open to strategic manipulation, with respondents concealing their true
preferences in order to influence the ultimate outcome.  In practice, we doubt this concern is relevant for these
descriptive analyses.
10Controlling for household income and other demographics, the proportion of respondents answering "yes"
is lower for richer countries.  If environmental quality is normal, this pattern only makes sense if the question
is interpreted as a marginal increase in quality, and richer countries have cleaner environments. 
among four choices, "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree."
9
Though the question is not a referendum, we can group the first two and last two responses
to simulate what a yes/no question would have yielded.  The question does seem to ask
about marginal willingness to pay, as opposed to total, and the pattern of responses across
incomes supports that interpretation.
10  
A larger problem with the "higher prices" question is that it does not ask about a
specific environmental problem.  If we find that MWTP does not follow a pattern predicted
by a particular theory, that could be because the theory is wrong, or because the question
is about an environmental problem that does not follow an inverse-U-shaped pollution-
income path, or because different countries face different environmental problems and
interpret the question differently.  Moreover, by asking about a price increase, the question
implicitly imposes a higher absolute cost on high-income respondents than on low-income
respondents.  Though this concern will be partially mitigated to the extent we can control
for household income, as we will describe, that control turns out to be problematic.  For
these reasons, we will compare the responses to this price question to the other
environmental questions asked by the WVS.
In sum, if our goal were to place a precise dollar value on people's willingness to
pay, we would be concerned about a number of features of these questions.  However our
goal is not to identify people's MWTP precisely.  Rather, we merely wish to establish the
relationships among people's MWTP, their individual household incomes, and the national
incomes of the countries in which they reside. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics.  Of the 36375 observations, a little less
than half (48 percent) said "yes" they would be willing to pay higher prices to protect the
environment.  (This is the sum of those who "agreed" and "strongly agreed.")  Not
surprisingly, this is highly correlated with respondents' opinions about the importance of
environmental protection relative to economic growth, and with respondents' propensity
to choose environmental products and to contribute to environmental organizations.
The per-capita GDP of people who said "yes" they would pay higher prices for the
environment is lower than that of people who said "no."  While the GDP difference is
statistically insignificant, people who support the environmental improvement are
significantly more likely to be female and younger.
The household income variable is a ranking of ten income categories for each
country. Households with higher relative incomes (categories 5 through 10) are more likely
to respond "yes" to the environmental questions (although this difference is statistically
significant only for the top income category).  Households with low relative incomes
(categories 2 through 4) are less likely to respond "yes," as would be expected if
10
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lowest category of incomes are more likely to respond "yes," although the difference in
responses is small (half of a percentage point) and only marginally significant.
Respondents with at least some university education and those living in bigger cities were
more likely to respond "yes" to paying for environmental improvements.
The models outlined in section 2 all describe a single representative agent.  In the
WVS, of course, respondents are heterogenous.  There are rich respondents in poor
countries and vice versa.  Hence, our goal is to describe how marginal willingness to pay
changes with national income, controlling for household characteristics.  Our strategy is
to estimate a set of linear probability models, where the dependent variables are equal to
one if the respondent agrees with the environmental question posed, and zero otherwise.
We control for the respondent's age, sex, income, education, and city size, and we include
a set of country-specific dummy variables, or fixed effects.  
The key role played by the country dummies is that we can plot their coefficients
against GDP per capita to see whether, in relative terms, rich countries' citizens have higher
or lower propensities to answer "yes" to the environmental questions.  Under the
technology constraint story, the country dummy coefficients should increase with income
for low-income countries.  Under the institutional constraint story, the coefficients should
increase and then decrease.  
Before turning to the results, one final problem with the data needs to be addressed.
For household income, respondents were asked to place themselves in one of 10 income
brackets, defined by specific monetary ranges (e.g. $0-$10000, $10000-$20000, etc.).
These brackets were different for each country, and were meant to correspond to the
income deciles for each country.  However, it is clear from the survey responses that the
categories rarely matched income deciles.  As a consequence, we have only a rough idea
of the relative income of households in each country.  A person in income category 5 in a
poor country may be poorer in absolute terms than a person in income category 5 in a rich
country.  The income categories are relative rankings of income, and differ by country.  If
we were to ignore this problem and simply regress MWTP on household income bracket
dummies and country dummies, the country dummies would pick up both country-level
income per capita and individual respondents' incomes.  If the country fixed effect for a
rich country were higher than for poor country, we would not be able to say for certain
whether that was due to individual preferences of richer people, or the institutional
characteristics of richer societies.  Absolute household income would be an important
omitted variable that is correlated with GDP per capita.
We deal with this concern in three ways.  First, we include in the regressions
demographic characteristics associated with human capital: age, sex, education, and city
size.  To the extent that these capture absolute household income, the omitted variable bias
is mitigated.  (We must interpret carefully those ancillary coefficients, as they reflect both
the direct effect of the demographics on MWTP, and the indirect effect via income.)
Second, we interact the 10 income categories with the per-capita GDP of the respondents'
country.  This means that the regressions include relative income (the income categories),
11
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per-capita GDP (embodied in the fixed effects), and the interaction between the two, which
we interpret as absolute household income.
As a third means of controlling for absolute household income, we use the coding
of the original income category questions, and assume that everybody in each income
category earns the midpoint of the relevant range.   For example, respondents in the United
States in category 5 ($30,000 to $39,999) would be assigned a household income of
$35,000.  Unfortunately only 9 countries in the data had complete enough documentation
available to assign absolute household incomes in comparable international dollars
(compared with 33 countries with complete answers to the other demographic questions).
Table 2 presents linear probability models for four of the environmental questions
in the WVS.  The table reports the coefficients on age, a female dummy, and income,
education and city size dummies.  Not reported are coefficients on the interactions between
per-capita GDP and the income dummies, and a set of country fixed effects.  In column (1)
the dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent answered "agree" or "strongly agree" to the
question about willingness to pay higher prices, and zero otherwise.  Older respondents are
significantly less likely to support protecting the environment.  All else equal, a person 10
years older will be 1.7 percent less likely to agree to pay higher prices to protect the
environment.  Female respondents are about 2.5 percent more likely to support the
environment.  Support for the environment is generally greater for the higher income
respondents, though the trend in the income category coefficients is not uniformly positive.
The negative coefficients imply that those in the top income category are more likely to
agree to higher prices than those in the other income categories.  And, support for the
environment is consistently increasing with education, with respondents with a formal
education more likely to support protecting the environment than those with no education.
The coefficients on per-capita GDP interacted with household income categories (not
reported) are small, mostly statistically insignificant, and do not seem to follow any
particular pattern.
11 
Figure 5 plots some country characteristics and regression coefficients against per-
capita GDP.  Panel A of figure 5 plots the average percent willing to pay higher prices to
protect the environment, by country.  Low-income countries display no particular pattern,
while among mid to high-income countries there may be a downward trend in the percent
supporting the environment.  Panel B of figure 5 plots the fixed-effects coefficients from
the first regression in Table 2.  After controlling for age, sex, household income, education,
and city size, the same pattern persists: low income countries display no pattern with
respect to GDP, while willingness to pay appears to decline for high-income countries.
This decline in MWTP for high-income countries is not inconsistent with any of the
theoretical models, and is consistent with the "institutional constraints" story.  
One reason MWTP may decline is that this first question asks about a 20 percent
increase in prices, obviously a relatively larger cost to high-spending households.  If we
12
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 3 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss1/art2have not successfully accounted for income with our demographic covariates and with the
interactions between relative income categories and GDP, then the country fixed effects
reflect in part the incomes of the respondents.  Higher-income countries may exhibit lower
MWTP because respondents are being asked to bear larger costs. 
To account for this concern, we have explored the other environmental questions
in the WVS.  Column 2 of table 2 asks whether people agree that "protecting the
environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth."  The
dependent variable is one if the environment is the priority and zero if economic growth
is the priority. The pattern of coefficients parallels those in column 1.  Younger people,
women, richer people, and more educated people are more likely to agree that the
environment should be a priority above growth.  Panel C of figure 5 plots the average
responses to this question against per-capita GDP.  Here there is no apparent downward
trend among mid to high-income countries.  Panel D plots the country fixed effects, from
column 2 of table 2, again with no apparent downward trend.  This is open to (at least) two
interpretations.  It may be that the downward trend in MWTP in response to the price
question is a spurious result of the fact that a price increase will cost higher-spending
households more.  Or, it may be that the question about the environment being a priority
is not interpreted by respondents as anything like a marginal willingness to pay.  
For comparison, consider the last two questions we explore: "have you chosen
household products you think are better for the environment?" and "have you contributed
to an environmental organization?"  We believe that these last two questions reflect total
rather than marginal willingness to pay.  They do not ask about willingness to pay extra
for an incremental improvement in environmental quality, but about whether the
respondent already contributes in some way towards existing environmental quality.
Furthermore, both poor households and rich households can purchase green products and
contribute to green organizations at any level and still respond "yes" to this question.
There is no sense in which this costs rich households more.  In fact, if households buy
products and contribute in proportion to their incomes, then poor households are paying
less for the positive response to this question than are rich households.  Panels E and G of
figure 5 plot the raw responses to these questions, and panels F and H plot the country
fixed-effects coefficients.  All exhibit an upward trend in the proportion saying "yes".  This
is consistent with the questions being interpreted as total willingness to pay, giving us
confidence in the survey results, but suggesting that these last two questions are
inappropriate for examining the theoretical patterns of marginal willingness to pay
described in section 2. 
As one final means of addressing our concern that we may not have controlled for
household income appropriately, and that the country fixed effects may be picking up
individual income differences, we estimated these models using estimates of actual annual
household incomes, rather than relative income categories.  For the 9 countries where the
survey documentation listed the complete income ranges, we assigned each respondent the
13
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and utilized for Macedonia.
midpoint of the appropriate range, after converting the income ranges to US dollars using
purchasing power parity.
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Table 3 presents the results of linear probability models using these estimates of
household income.  The first column contains the results for answers to the question about
willingness to pay higher prices to protect the environment.  As in table 2, each 10 years
of age subtracts about 2 percent from the probability that a respondent agrees.  Women are
about 3 percent more likely to support the environment.  Each $10000 of household income
adds about 1.7 percent to the probability that a respondent expresses willingness to pay
higher prices.  And, more educated respondents are generally more willing to pay higher
prices than are respondents with less formal education.  Figure 6 plots the country fixed
effects from the regressions in table 3.  These follow roughly the same pattern as when
income categories are included, though of course there are many fewer countries.  
Columns 2 through 4 of table 3 present the results for the other three environment
questions, again using actual household incomes rather than relative categories.  Again the
results are similar.  Figure 6 plots the country fixed-effects coefficients.  It is hard to
discern any pattern in the fraction of respondents listing the environment as a priority over
growth in panel B, and the fraction of respondents choosing environmental products and
contributing to environmental organizations increases with per-capita GDP in panels C and
D.
While MWTP does not appear either to increase or decrease with per-capita GDP
among the low-income countries, the country fixed effects do explain much of the variation
in MWTP, and the estimated coefficients for the individual countries are generally
statistically significant. This suggests that there may be country characteristics other than
per-capita GDP that affect the MWTP of respondents.  In some cases there appear to be
similarities among the MWTP of respondents in the same region.  Among the Latin
American countries, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico have similar estimated
coefficients when examining the willingness to pay higher prices (although Chile, Peru,
and the Dominican Republic are not very similar).  However, there do not seem to be
general patterns distinguishing the MWTP of low-income countries of one region from
another.
The estimation technique presented here places no structure on the pattern of
willingness to pay across countries.  We have merely estimated linear probability models
of the probability that people say "yes" in response to a question about the environment,
and then plotted the coefficients on a set of country fixed effects.  In addition to these
results, we have also estimated linear probability models in the spline of per-capita GDP,
probit models and splines, and linear probabilities and probits of quadratic functions of per-
capita GDP.  In those cases, we have included country characteristics including Gini
coefficients, air pollution readings, and dummy variables for former Soviet bloc countries
14
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(transitional economies) and other low-income developing countries.
13  We have also
estimated these models with and without the sampling weights provided in the WVS.  For
none of the specifications, however, does a consistent pattern emerge for the low-income
countries.  Looking at the data in figure 5, it is easy to see why.
4.  Conclusions
The various theories described in section 2 all aim to explain the observation that
some pollutants worsen and then improve as countries' economies grow.  Each theory has
a different implication for the patterns of people's marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for
improvements in environmental quality.  Stokey's technological constraint explanation
predicts that MWTP will increase with per-capita GDP for countries with incomes below
the level where their environments begin to improve.  Jones and Manuelli's institutional
constraint story predicts that MWTP will increase and then decrease with per-capita GDP,
with a peak at the point where countries' environments begin improving.  And theories
based on individual preferences, as well as the returns-to-scale explanation of Andreoni
and Levinson, have no prediction about how MWTP will change as per-capita GDP
increases. 
Using data from the WVS we do not find strong evidence that people's MWTP
increases with per-capita GDP among low-income countries.  This may be because the
technological and institutional constraint stories do not explain the inverse-U-shaped
pollution-income path.  Or, it may be because we have a poor measure of MWTP, from a
deficient contingent valuation question, because we have poor controls for households'
incomes, or because respondents are thinking about some environmental problem that does
not follow an inverse-U or different environmental problems in different countries.
Finally, although we have not been able to discern a pattern in the relationship
between MWTP for environmental improvements and national income, that is not to say
that country-specific institutional explanations are not important.  To the contrary, even
though we have included ample demographic characteristics of respondents, the country
fixed effects explain a large fraction of the variation in the responses.  This suggests that
country characteristics matter, though perhaps not in the stylized way suggested by the
models in section 2.
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Willing to pay higher prices to protect the
environment?
Variable Yes    No   
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Sample standard deviations for continuous variables in parentheses.   * Differences
statistically significant at 5 percent.   
† Differences statistically significant at 10 percent.
a These environmental questions had slightly fewer responses: 30809, 30401, and 34338,
respectively.
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0.72 0.78 0.44 0.70
Notes: 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent.
† Statistically significant at 10 percent.
   Each regression includes country fixed effects and a set of interaction terms between GDP
per capita and the 10 household income categories.
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0.69 0.64 0.62 0.46
Notes: 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent.
† Statistically significant at 10 percent.
   Each regression includes country fixed effects and a set of city size dummies, as in table 2.
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Figure 2.  Dirtiest technology explanation
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Figure 4.  Returns to scale explanation
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1) The key income question:
V227. Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is,
counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.
2) Environment questions:
  V39  I would buy things at 20% higher than usual prices if it would help protect the
environment.
a.  agree strongly, 
b.  agree, 
c.  disagree or 
d.  disagree strongly?
V41  Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and
economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?
1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower
economic growth and some loss of jobs.
2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the
environment suffers to some extent.
3. Other answer (volunteered).
Which, if any, of these things have you done in the last 12 months, out of concern for the
environment?
V42  Have you chosen household products that you think are better for the environment? 
                        
V45  Have you attended a meeting or signed a letter or petition aimed at protecting the
environment?
                        
V46  Have you contributed to an environmental organization?
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Countries ranked by per
capita GDP










Nigeria  0.454           0.82           1604          
Bangladesh  0.667           1.34           1173          
Ghana  0.452           1.71           42          
India  0.379           1.87           1260          
Azerbaijan  0.340           2.02           1561          
Armenia  0.453           2.12           1621          
Georgia*  0.578           2.20           2073          
Moldova  0.332           2.20           900          
China  0.600           2.68           1274          
Ukraine 0.379           3.49           1687          
Macedonia* 0.544           4.43           588          
Peru 0.579           4.48           321          
Dominic Rep 0.767           4.59           317          
Bulgaria 0.492           4.86           653          
Latvia* 0.271           5.30           1034          
Belarus 0.491           5.42           1704          
Croatia* 0.472           5.91           1084          
Venezuela* 0.546           5.95           1069          
Lithuania 0.360           6.03           753          
Estonia* 0.463           6.98           947          
Brazil 0.557           7.06           1084          
Russia 0.446           7.21           1690          
Mexico 0.536           7.22           1022          
Poland 0.470           7.71           976          
Chile 0.488           8.28           897          
Uruguay 0.531           8.49           880          
Spain* 0.648           15.41           815          
Finland 0.474           20.01           837          
Australia 0.498           21.56           1712          
Germany 0.604           22.65           1636          
Switzerland* 0.422           26.18           909          
Norway 0.399           26.76           1033          
USA* 0.358           28.17           1219          
1 Source: Authors’ calculations from World Values Survey, Wave 3.
2 Source: World Bank (2002), adjusted using purchasing power parity.
* Documentation available for household income brackets, used in table 3 and figure 5.
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